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Vernaculars Cross-Dressed as 
Universals: Globalization as 
North Atlantic Hegemony
James C. Scott
I. A Perspective on Globalization
Most conceptions of “globalization” take the term to mean simply 
the various ways in which all corners of the globe are increasingly con-
nected by trade, finance, communication, travel, cultural exchange, 
etc., and the degree to which the interconnections are of much greater 
volume and much greater speed than before. With the 2008 financial 
crisis in immediate view, one can appreciate the speed with which not 
only, say, jazz and pop music circulate the globe, but also the speed 
with which financial panics have been communicated and amplified.
I choose here a slightly different view by focusing on what global-
ization may eliminate, diminish, or replace: vernacular practices such 
as the cultures, religions, and languages of less numerous peoples, 
local forms of agriculture and land tenure, and other ways of life and 
institutions that appear to stand in the way of standardization. I posit 
this to be the dark side of standardization, although I am not unappre-
ciative of the emancipatory effect of standardizations of human rights 
and access to justice.
II. Vernaculars Meet Universals
I’ll begin with three anecdotes chosen to illustrate the troubled rela-
tionship between vernacular and local knowledge, on the one hand, 
and “official,” synoptic knowledge, on the other. They are all tales of 
standardization and legibility at the national level. After discussing 
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them, I will move to projects of standardization at the international 
level and therefore to “globalization.”
A. Roads
A contrast between local names for roads and state names for roads 
will help illustrate two variants of legibility. There is, for example, a 
small road joining the towns of Durham and Guilford in the state of 
Connecticut. Those who live in Durham call this road (among them-
selves) the “Guilford Road,” presumably because it informs the inhab-
itants of Durham exactly where they’ll get to if they travel it. The same 
road, at its Guilford terminus, is called the “Durham Road” because 
it tells the inhabitants of Guilford where the road will lead them. One 
imagines that at some liminal midpoint, the road hovers between these 
two identities. Such names work perfectly well; they each encode valu-
able local knowledge, perhaps the most important fact one might want 
to know about a road. That the same road has two names, depending 
on one’s location, demonstrates the situational, contingent nature of 
local naming practices. Informal, “folk” naming practices not only pro-
duce the anomaly of a road with two or more names, they also produce 
many different roads with the same name. Thus, the nearby towns of 
Killingworth, Haddam, Madison, and Meriden each have roads lead-
ing to Durham which the inhabitants locally call the “Durham Road.”
Now imagine the insuperable problems that this locally effective 
folk system would pose to an outsider requiring unambiguous iden-
tifications for each road. A state road repair crew, sent to fix potholes 
on the “Durham Road,” would have to ask, “Which Durham Road?” 
Thus it is no surprise that the road between Durham and Guilford is 
reincarnated on all state maps and designations as “Route 77.” Each 
micro-segment of that route, moreover, is identified by means of tele-
phone pole serial numbers, milestones, and township boundaries. The 
naming practices of the state require a synoptic view, a standardized 
scheme of identification generating mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
designations. This system can work to the benefit of state residents. If 
you have to be rescued on Route 77 by a state-dispatched ambulance 
team, you will be reassured to know that there is no ambiguity about 
which road it is that you are bleeding on.
All place names, personal names, and names of roads or rivers 
encode important knowledge. Some of that knowledge is a thumbnail 
history, e.g., Maiden Lane (the lane where five spinster sisters once 
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lived), Cider Hill Road (the road up the hill where the cider mill and 
orchard once stood), and Cream Pot Road (once the site of a dairy 
where neighbors went to buy milk, cream, and butter). At one time, 
when the name became fixed, it was probably the most relevant and 
useful name for local inhabitants. Other names refer to geographical 
features, e.g., Mica Ridge Road, Bare Rock Road, Ball Brook Road. The 
sum of roads and place names in a small place, in fact, amounts to 
something of a local geography and history if one knows the stories, 
features, episodes, and family enterprises encoded within them.
For officials who require a radically different form of order, such 
local knowledge, however quaint, is illegible. Local knowledge is priv-
ileged over synoptic, standardized knowledge. In the case of colonial 
rule, when the conquerors speak an entirely different language, the 
unintelligibility of the vernacular landscape is a nearly insurmount-
able obstacle to effective rule. Renaming much of the landscape, there-
fore, is an essential step of imperial rule. This explains why the British 
Ordinance Survey of Ireland in the 1830s recorded and rendered many 
local Gaelic place names (e.g., Bun na hAbhann, Gaelic for “mouth of 
the river”) in a form (Burnfoot) more easily understood by the rulers.
B. Communities
The second anecdote is meant to illustrate how pre-modern vernacu-
lar identities are ill suited to state projects of synoptic order. It comes 
from a mediocre movie, Witness, which nevertheless provides an apt 
illustration of the point I wish to make. For those of you who were 
fortunate enough to have been doing something more productive with 
your time when it was playing, let me briefly recall for you the plot. 
Harrison Ford plays a detective trying to solve a crime committed in 
a bus station, in Philadelphia I believe, witnessed by a young Amish 
boy. Arriving in a town near the Amish community armed with only 
the last name of the young witness, let’s call him “Boop,” the detective 
begins with the first and most reliable instrument of sleuths, the tele-
phone book.
Notice, for a second, what a wonderful instrument of police work the 
telephone book is: a list of everyone in the community, arranged alpha-
betically by last name, complete with street address and the means, 
via a unique telephone number, for reaching them. But wait! This is an 
Amish community and virtually no one has a telephone. Strike one. 
The investigator does have the last name of the boy and begins to ask 
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around. The Amish have a small number of widely shared last names 
and there are a dozen or more families in the county who have the last 
name of Boop. Strike two.
The tools of modern police work are frustrated when faced with a 
traditional community. Here is where the “love-interest” in the movie 
comes in. Ford befriends a young Amish woman who becomes his 
local informant and tracker, and thus finally locates the boy. The point 
is simply that the traditional community is well-nigh impenetrable and 
opaque to modern police. Discriminating interventions, as opposed to 
blunt force, are difficult to devise without transparent, synoptic identi-
ties.
Until modern forms of legal identities and record keeping were 
devised, it is hard to exaggerate the degree of ignorance of state offi-
cials about the society over which they presided. State officials had 
only the most tenuous idea of the population under their jurisdiction, 
its movements, its real property, wealth, crop yields, etc. Their degree 
of ignorance was directly proportional to the fragmentation of their 
sources of information. Local currencies and local measures of capacity 
(e.g., the bushel) and length (the ell, the rod, and the toise) were likely 
to vary from place to place and with the nature of the transacting par-
ties. The opacity of local society was, of course, actively maintained 
by local elites as one effective means of resistance to intrusions from 
above.
Having little synoptic, aggregate intelligence about the manpower 
and resources available to them, officials were apt either to overreach 
in their exactions, touching off flight or revolt, or to fail to mobilize the 
resources that were, in fact, available. To follow the process of state 
making, then, is to follow the conquest of illegibility. The account of this 
conquest—an achievement won against stiff resistance—could take 
many forms, such as the creation of the cadastral survey and uniform 
property registers, the invention and imposition of the meter, national 
censuses and currencies, and the development of uniform legal codes.
One crucial and diagnostic victory in this campaign for legibility 
was the creation of fixed, legal patronyms. If vernacular landscape-
naming practices are opaque and illegible to outside officials, vernacu-
lar personal naming practices are even more so. The fixing of personal 
names, and, in particular, permanent patronyms, as legal identities 
seems everywhere to have been, broadly speaking, a state project. With 
the single exception of China, no one in the world had permanent 
patronyms until the 13th or 14th century and some nations have estab-
James C. Scott
7
lished them only in the last century, for example, Iran, Turkey, and 
Thailand. As an early and imperfect legal identification, the permanent 
patronym was linked to such vital administrative functions as tithe and 
tax collection, property registers, conscription lists, and census rolls. To 
understand why fixed, legal patronyms represent such a quantum leap 
in the legibility of a population to state officials, it is first necessary 
to understand the utter fluidity of vernacular naming practices unin-
flected by state routines.
Vernacular naming practices throughout much of the world are 
enormously rich and varied. In many cultures, an individual’s name 
will change from context to context and, within the same context, over 
time. It is not uncommon for a newborn to have had one or more name 
changes in utero in the event the mother’s labor seemed to be going 
badly. Names often vary at each stage of life (infancy, childhood, adult-
hood, parenthood, old age) and, in some cases, after death. Added to 
these may be names used for joking, rituals, mourning, nicknames, 
school names, secret names, names for age-mates or same-sex friends, 
and names for in-laws. Each name is specific to a phase of life, a social 
setting, or a particular interlocutor. To the question “What is your 
name?,” the reply in such cases can only be “It depends.”
In the small vernacular community, of course, this cornucopia of 
names occasions no confusion whatsoever. As with the term “Guilford 
Road,” local residents know the names they need to know, the codes 
appropriate to their use, the room for maneuver within these codes, 
and the ways in which these codes might be transgressed. They are 
rarely in doubt about who is who.
How is local confusion avoided in the absence of permanent patro-
nyms? Let us take the simplest case in which there are a small number 
of fixed, given names (often called “first” or “Christian” names in 
Western Europe). It is claimed, for example, that around the year 1700 
in England, a mere eight given names accounted for nearly ninety 
percent of the total male population (John, Edward, William, Henry, 
Charles, James, Richard, Robert). Without permanent patronyms, 
local people had innumerable ways of unambiguously identifying any 
given individual. A by-name, second-name, or (sur)name (not to be 
confused with a permanent patronym) was usually sufficient to make 
the defining distinction. One “John,” for example, might be distin-
guished from another by specifying his father’s name (William’s John 
or John-William’s-son/Williamson); by linking him to an occupation 
(John-the-Miller, John-the Shepherd); by locating him in the landscape 
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(John-on-the-Hill, John-by-the-Brook); or by noting a personal charac-
teristic (John-do-little). The written records of the manor or the parish 
might actually bear notations of such by-names for the sake of clarity.1
The vernacular communities of the past were quasi-opaque to 
state officials. Access to individuals was typically achieved indirectly 
through intermediaries: the local nobleman, village headman, imam or 
parish priest, tavern keeper, notary. Such intermediaries, naturally, had 
their own individual and corporate interests. They might profit hand-
somely from their gate-keeping role. In any case, their interests were 
never perfectly coincident with those of state officials, and often at 
cross-purposes. It is for such reasons that locally kept census rolls have 
often underreported the population (to evade taxes, corvée labor, con-
scription) and both arable land acreage and crop yields understated.
The problem of naming and identification can be expressed gener-
ally. Let us imagine a police official (it could be a tax collector or a con-
scription officer) who is trying to locate a specific, unique individual. 
Assume further that he is faced with a situation not unlike that of a 
small English town in 1700, but with no surnames, let alone fixed pat-
ronymic surnames. Take a comparatively simple case of a town with, 
say, 1,000 males bearing only one of eight names, which are, for the 
sake of this initial case, perfectly evenly distributed across the (male) 
population. How likely, then, is our police official to collar the man he 
is after? If he knows he is looking for a “Henry,” there will be 125 Hen-
rys in this village and 124 of them will be the wrong Henry. Without 
local assistance and under the assumption, for the sake of argument, 
that he actually knows the true given names of all villagers, he will 
almost surely fail. What if we imagine that all males in this village have 
two names, which vary independently? In this case, the chances that 
the police official will grab the wrong Henry are much reduced, but 
still substantial, as there will be about fifteen Henry Thomases, fifteen 
William Jameses, etc. Once we move to three names (also varying inde-
pendently), it is likely that the police official will get his man half the 
time on average. The opacity of the villagers to outside identification is 
reduced radically by the use of each additional identifying name.2
If we arbitrarily impose on such a town a permanent legal patronym 
such that Thomas-son-of-William is registered as Thomas Williamson 
and his son as, say, Henry Williamson, and his son as Edward William-
son, and so on, we do not improve the odds for the police who want 
to identify an individual in his generation but we do vastly improve 
the odds of identifying his parents, grandparents, sons and daughters, 
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who must necessarily bear the same permanent patronym. Questions 
of inheritance, paternity, and household affiliation become far more 
transparent, but never entirely so.
Before the advent of internal passports, photographs, and social 
security numbers (let alone fingerprints and DNA), personal names 
were the form of identification most germane to police work. The use 
of personal names to locate a person depended, of course, on the com-
pliance of the individual and the community in revealing true names. 
Where the community was hostile and the individual evasive, state 
officials were stymied. Hence the official predilection for internal pass-
ports that must be carried at all times under penalty of fines, or, better 
yet, for fingerprints which are unique and hard to efface or, still better, 
for DNA profiles, a unique marker present in any sample of tissue long 
after death.
Let us assume, for the moment, both a high level of compliance 
and a world in which the personal name is the key identifier. The 
police—here used as a convenient shorthand for any authorities want-
ing to locate a specific individual—may have their task complicated 
in either of two ways. The smaller the number of names in use within 
a population, the more difficult becomes the process of identification. 
We might think of this as the “needle” part of the “looking for a needle 
in a haystack” problem. How many needles look just like the particu-
lar needle we are looking for? The size of the haystack is also crucial. 
Broadly speaking, the haystack conundrum is a problem of scale. Once 
police work becomes a matter of finding a unique individual in a 
large town or a province, let alone a nation, the confusion of identical 
names becomes an administrative nightmare. The nightmare is further 
compounded by geographical mobility. If people are moving with any 
frequency, it becomes well-nigh impossible to know in which of many 
haystacks to search them out.
The modern state, by which I mean a state whose ideology encom-
passes large-scale plans for the improvement of the population’s wel-
fare, requires at least two forms of legibility to be able to achieve its 
mission. First, it requires the capacity to locate citizens uniquely and 
unambiguously. Second, it needs standardized information that will 
allow it to create aggregate statistics about property, income, health, 
demography, productivity, and so on. Although much of the synoptic, 
aggregate information officials of the modern state require is collected 
initially from individuals, it must be collected in a form that makes it 
amenable to an overall statistical profile—a shorthand map of some 
social or economic condition relevant for state purposes.
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C. Taxes
The third anecdote is meant to illustrate that statistics or, more broadly, 
state forms of “vision” are not simply observations of reality without 
consequences. Any observation by a powerful institution with par-
ticular interests has the power, under many circumstances, to change 
reality.
My favorite example is the brilliantly conceived new “Window and 
Door” tax of the absolutist kings of France in the 17th century. Deter-
mined to institute a tax on houses but reluctant to incur the admin-
istrative cost of actually calculating the square meters of a house by 
measuring its interior or exterior—and surely incurring the wrath of 
the householder—the tax functionaries hit on the idea of simply cir-
cumnavigating the house, counting the number of windows and doors, 
and assessing a tax on that basis. It was an effective cost-saving idea. 
Given the building standards of the time, the number of doors and 
windows of a house was a virtually perfect proxy for its size/square 
meters of floor space, at least at the beginning of the exercise.
Once the tax was in place, however, the fun had just begun. As one 
can imagine, every house subsequently built or substantially rebuilt 
was constructed with one eye on the taxman so the number of aper-
tures, whether windows or doors, were kept to a minimum. One imag-
ines that, for the next 250 years, many thousands of peasants and 
artisans choked on the smoke that could not now easily be vented 
from the coal and wood fires used for cooking and heating. Because it 
was an observation with serious consequences, the Window and Door 
tax became something like a fiscal Heisenberg Principle, changing the 
reality it had initially only sought to observe.
III. Native Americans: Renaming and More
A brief account of the “naming” of Native Americans seems germane 
here for two reasons. First, it makes clear the linkage between private 
freehold property and official names. Second, it concerns the founder 
of one of Macalester’s distinguished sister institutions, Grinnell Col-
lege.
The story of conquest, particularly in European settler colonies 
where the conquerors held overwhelming power, could be written as 
a vast project of renaming the natural world. Presto! Native names for 
flora, fauna, insects, mountains, valleys, and birds were effaced and 
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replaced by the nouns and taxonomies of the conquerors. This pro-
cess, too, is a project of legibility, a transfer of knowledge in which the 
mystifying (to Europeans) hieroglyphics of native naming practices 
was replaced by imported practices transparent to Europeans, and 
now mystifying to the conquered. Comprehensive re-labeling is a pre-
condition for the transfer of power, management, and control. In the 
case of the United States, only on occasion do Native American names 
persist (particularly in the names of rivers, the great arteries of early 
colonial trade).
Nowhere is this hegemonic project more apparent than in the effort 
to rename the individual “native subjects” of this colonial enterprise 
in a fashion that would allow the colonizers to identify each (male!) 
unambiguously as a legal person. To grasp the importance and scope 
of this undertaking, its function in promoting legibility and its role as 
a civilizational discourse, it is helpful to appreciate just how illegible 
Native American naming practices were to Europeans.
A. Illegibility
Officials encountered among “Indians” what they considered a radical 
instability and plurality of names. As in many small stateless societ-
ies, a person would have several names dependent on the situation 
of address (e.g., among age-mates, between generations, among close 
kin) and these names would often change over time. A child who ran 
screaming into the tepee on seeing a bear might be called “Runs-from-
the-Bear.” Later on, if she rides a horse from which others have been 
thrown, she might be called “Rides-the-Horse.” A hunter who was 
called “Five Bears” may be called “Six Bears” upon killing another. 
Researchers tracing surname adoption among the Weagamow Ojibwa 
noted the plurality of names, in this case partly due to contact with 
Europeans. The same individual was variously known as Freed Smith, 
Banani, Nizopitawigizik, and Fredrick Sagachekipoo.
The plurality of names, as the previous example illustrates, was 
not simply a consequence of indigenous naming practices; it was sub-
stantially increased by overlapping jurisdictions and by problems of 
transliteration. An individual might have one or another of his names 
recorded by several authorities: a trading post, clerk, missionary, tribal 
scribe, or a military or civilian administrator. Each name might be 
different and, if the people in question were migratory, the places of 
registration would vary. Imagine trying to pin down the identity of 
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persons who have five or six names and who are constantly on the 
move! Here, of course, it is important to recall that the recording of 
names was either an attempt at translation into English (e.g., Six Bears) 
or a stab at transliteration for which there were no fixed rules. The 
result, in both cases, was names that bore an indifferent relationship 
to the indigenous appellation they purported to transcribe. In the case 
of translation, even an accurate one, the name became nothing more 
than a nonsense syllable for non-English-speaking Indians. In the case 
of transliteration, the problems were compounded by large phono-
logical differences between English and native tongues. Thus, in the 
case of the Severn Ojibwa, such differences produced exotic local ren-
derings of English given names: e.g., Flora=Pinona; Hector=Ehkitah; 
Telma=Temina; Isabel=Saben; Amos=Thomas; Louise=Anoys. In the 
case of direct transliteration of the indigenous names of different per-
sons, as among the Crow at the Devil’s Lake Agency in North Dakota, 
one imagines that the recorded names were only one of the many pos-
sible phonetic renderings: Eyaupahamini, Iyayahamani, Ecanajinka, 
Wiyakimaza, Wakauhotanina, Wasineasuwmani, Tiowaste. Had there 
been standard rules for transliteration and had the recorders of names 
followed these rules rigorously, the results would have still been mys-
tifying and unpronounceable to white officials.
There were two further problems from the point of view of govern-
ment agents. First, even translated names that could be understood 
came in an incompatible format. Take, for example, the names “Bar-
kley-on-the-other-side,” “Alice shoots-as-she-goes,” “Irvie comes out 
of fog” (Montana, Crow). The given name is clear, perhaps, but what 
should be taken as the surname? The whole phrase, the last word…?
Second, and more serious, the indigenous naming system rarely 
gave any indication of sex or family relationship. Among the Southern 
Cheyenne, the following “family names” were recorded:
Father Gunaoi
Mother Deon
1st Daughter Halli
2nd Daughter Aisima
3rd Daughter Imaguna
1st Son Inali
2nd Son Zepko
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While the letter recording these names notes that they do not indicate 
the sex of the children, in fact what the writer means is that, if sex is 
indicated, it is not a code that he understands. Even when the transla-
tion into English names prevailed among the Cheyenne, the names 
very rarely indicated the roles in a nuclear family so prized by offi-
cials: thus, “Crow Neck,” his ‘wife’ “Walking Road,” and their sons, 
“Clarence Crow Neck,” “Rested Wolf,” and “Hunting Over.” On the 
Arapaho roster there are “Bear Lariat,” his ‘wife’ “Mouse,” sons “Sit-
ting Man” and “Charles Lariat,” and daughter “Singing Above.” As 
is evident, such illegible naming practices were unsuited to the twin 
normative legal requirements of “civilized” life: property ownership 
and marriage by law.
B. Property: The Dawes Act
So long as the administrative regime governing Native Americans 
resembled indirect rule and so long as the aims of white officials were 
containment and military security, then the Native Americans’ seem-
ingly promiscuous and illegible naming practices were inconvenient, 
but not fatal. Officials worked through their own Indian employees 
and a handful of chiefs. They were dependent on “native-trackers” for 
detailed information or for locating a particular individual.
All this changed with the Dawes Act of 1887, which authorized the 
President to allot 160 acres to each family head (presumptively a male) 
on a reservation. The title to the land would be held in trust for twenty-
five years (apparently to prevent victimization of the new landowners 
by speculators), after which it would revert to the allottee and his heirs. 
The goal, aside from seizing more tribal land for white settlers, was the 
cultural assimilation of Native Americans: “[A]fter receiving his allot-
ment, which signified his severance from the tribe and its communal 
ways, he would become subject to the laws of the state or territory in 
which he resided.” In this sense, the Dawes Act was “a mighty pulver-
izing engine for the breaking up of the tribal mass.”
Now that many male Native Americans would become property-
owning citizens—no longer exclusively under tribal jurisdiction, but 
citizens with rights and obligations under the laws of the larger soci-
ety—their illegibility as individuals was no longer acceptable. Native 
American naming practices were suitable for a common-property 
regime with a loose family structure and nomadic ways. They were 
not suitable for a newly created, sedentary, property-owning citizen 
Macalester International  Vol. 24
14
yeomanry. As legal persons, Native Americans now needed a legal 
identity proper to the state.
The immediate impetus behind a standardization of Indian names 
was the institution of private property in land. Allotments meant 
deeds, titles, cadastral surveys, and inheritance rules. These, in turn, 
required an unambiguous legal identity—preferably one that reflected 
close kinship ties (i.e., the “normative” nuclear family). Reformers, 
who believed allotments were the route to a necessary and benefi-
cial assimilation, were intent on avoiding the confusion and litigation 
that customary naming practices might encourage. They set about 
standardizing names to make sure that land was registered under an 
unambiguous identity: names with permanent patronyms that would 
reduce the legal confusion about exactly who were a deceased land-
owner’s heirs.
What is noteworthy here is the unavoidable, not to say coercive, 
logic joining standardized legal identities, on the one hand, and prop-
erty ownership, on the other. As one official wrote, the American 
system of naming was a good system, for it fixes the name of each indi-
vidual after an unvarying fashion, and establishes the same practically 
beyond alteration:
We cannot see how it could be otherwise than it is. Furthermore, and 
what makes it so important, it is practically the only system known to 
American law, and it is impossible not to see that in all things, prominent 
among which is the transfer of property or the bequeathing of the same 
to heirs, trouble must come to those who disregard this system.
Once the allotments were decided upon, a whole set of gears were 
inexorably set into motion. The process is a classic example of practi-
cal, systemic, hegemony; property deeds, land records, and property 
taxes require synoptic, standardized forms of identification.
The enormous diversity of Native American naming practices, the 
varying degrees of contact and assimilation, and the huge variety of 
administrative arrangements under which they were governed cre-
ated nearly insurmountable problems of illegibility. The “Poet of the 
Prairie,” Hamlin Garland, made “the naming of the Red Men as they 
became citizens,” a personal mission, seeking the confidence of Presi-
dent Theodore Roosevelt in carrying it out successfully. In a letter urg-
ing Teddy Roosevelt to place George Bird Grinnell (a naturalist and 
ethnographer of the Cheyenne) in charge of a committee to rename all 
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Native Americans, his plea makes it clear that his proximate goal is to 
establish, for all Indians, a secure legal identity:
It is imperative that family names should be reasonable and according 
to some system. The whole list is an inextricable tangle…They must be 
named according to their family relation in order to prevent endless 
legal complication…The work should be done by a central committee 
and not by the various clerks of the agencies.
The overriding concern with establishing a systematic, centralized 
formula for renaming was echoed by the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, Thomas J. Morgan, in 1890. Although “the command to give 
names to the Indians and to establish the same as far as possible by 
continuous use had been part of the Rules and Regulations for years 
past,” it had not been widely applied or generalized. He proposed 
general guidelines for the renaming exercise. A further regulation 
deplored the lackadaisical efforts to systematize and enforce the new 
names, leaving in their wake a host of confusing, unpronounceable, 
and insulting patronyms. He further scolded both his subordinates 
and his Native American charges:
Such Indian agents and superintendents of Indian schools have not 
sought to impress the Indian people with the importance of having their 
names fashioned after the whites, consequently they have had in this 
direction the opposition instead of the cooperation of the Indians. In this 
thing, as in nearly all others, the Indians do not know what is best for 
them. They can’t see that our system has any advantages over their own, 
and they have fought stubbornly against the innovation.
Morgan, Grinnell, and Garland tried, by the standards of the time, 
to be as accommodating as they could to indigenous naming prac-
tices, so long as they conformed to minimal standards of legibility. 
Morgan and Grinnel were not opposed to retaining Indian names, 
providing that they were not “too difficult to pronounce.” The rub, of 
course, was that this rationale referred to the difficulty experienced by 
native English speakers. Otherwise English names and translations 
were to be substituted whenever the original name was long and/or 
difficult. Garland agreed. Easily spoken names, such as “To-re-ach” or 
“Chonoh,” might be retained while others would require translation 
and, frequently, shortening as well. “Black Bull” might be shortened 
to “Blackbill” or “Blackbell;” “Standing Bull” to “Stanbull;” “Albert 
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Spotted-Horse” to “Albert Spotted;” “Black Owl” to “Blackall;” “Brave 
Bear” to “Bravber.” A Christian “given name” was normally appended 
as a first name, e.g., “Charles Stanbull.” As Garland noted, the point 
was that, “our Indians should be entirely renamed according to some 
general system,” retaining the Indians’ own name whenever possible, 
shortening or modifying it so that it can be spoken by the Red Man’s 
neighbor, “so that it name(s) all children after their father or a name 
chosen by their mother,” in short, “a system which will show family 
relations, which will meet the wishes of the red people and be com-
prehensible to the white people.” The aim, Garland wrote, was to start 
each allottee with a decent and reasonable name. Names that, when 
translated, seemed demeaning (e.g., “Ghost-faced Woman,” “Drunk-
ard,” “Let them Have Enough,” “Nancy Kills a Hundred,” “Rotten 
Pumpkin”) were to be avoided.
C. The Civilizational Project
The renaming of Native Americans was a “civilizing project” in at 
least two respects. The first is most obvious. The “Red Man” was being 
inducted, through the Dawes Act, into a radically new life that would 
eventually lead, it was hoped, to complete assimilation. Just as the 
precondition for the emancipation and full citizenship of the Jews in 
Central Europe was the legal adoption of permanent patronyms along 
Christian lines, so was a fixed legal patronym a condition of post-reser-
vation life. The creation of such a legal identity was the necessary “uni-
versal gear” which would then engage the other gears of the official 
machinery of the modern state.
In 1819, Congress established a “Civilization Fund” to introduce the 
Indian to “the habits and arts of civilization.” In general, its goal was 
to transform what were seen (often mistakenly) as exclusively hunting-
and-gathering cultures dependent on nomadism and communal own-
ership of land into a sedentary, agrarian (and artisan) society based on 
private property. The former condition, requiring bravery, shrewdness, 
and honor, was associated with savagery, whereas a settled life with 
cultivated property was seen as the handmaiden of civilization:
you may look forward to the period when the savage shall be converted 
to the citizen, when he hunter shall be transformed into the mechanic, 
when the farm, the workshop, the school-house, and the church shall 
adorn every Indian village; when the fruits of industry, good order, and 
sound morals shall bless every Indian dwelling.
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Accomplishing this work, the Director of the Bureau of Ethnol-
ogy, John Wesley Powell, reasoned, required new names which “tend 
strongly toward the breaking up of the Indian tribal system, which 
is perpetuated and ever kept in mind by the Indian’s own system of 
names.” The reservation system, as a structure of physical confine-
ment and surveillance, was itself not conceived as a project of cultural 
autonomy but a prelude to transformation. “Restricting the tribes to a 
limited and permanent area was a prerequisite to successfully civiliz-
ing them.”
The second civilizing project—one embedded in the formula for 
renaming the Indians—was the restructuring of the family to bring 
it into line with the normative patriarchy of their white Christian 
neighbors. Family and kinship practices vary widely among Native 
Americans, but it is safe to say that they rarely resembled the codified 
religious and legal forms of the dominant society. Plural and serial 
unions, child-rearing by the extended family, and changes in the com-
position of bands over time were common and only served to confirm 
the need for civilizing efforts.
The illegibility of Native American kinship nomenclature was fre-
quently taken by the would-be civilizers as a direct indication, not of 
a different kinship order, but of confusion and disorder among the Indi-
ans themselves about kinship relations. Just as the Spanish Governor 
General of the Philippines imagined that patronyms would help Filipi-
nos figure out who their cousins were (and avoid marrying them), so 
did the namers of the “Red Men” imagine that they were helping their 
charges sort out the primeval mess of their savage ways. Hamlin Gar-
land, for example, supposed that the mere absence of a common patro-
nym joining siblings was evidence “that each child stands alone in the 
world.” Writing of the Southern Cheyenne tribal roll, he declared, “The 
whole list is an inextricable tangle. For example, practically only one 
man can straighten out the family ramifications among the Southern 
Cheyenne.” It is not entirely clear whether Garland imagined that the 
Cheyenne themselves were in doubt about their relationship to one 
another, but it is clear that he believed that they (as well as the white 
man) would be thankful for a kinship terminology that clarified mat-
ters. Reading the correspondence and official circulars makes it appear 
that the reformers believed that if they just got the kinship terminology 
right, the actual practices of Native Americans would soon fall in line.
Macalester International  Vol. 24
18
D. Boarding Schools
Nowhere was the civilizational project more in evidence than in the 
boarding schools set up for Native American schoolchildren. The logic 
behind the boarding school was precisely the logic of the “total institu-
tion.” One might flail away at effecting small changes among masses 
of Native Americans on the reservation or, alternatively, concentrate 
on a smaller number of children at an impressionable age, away from 
the contaminating influence of the tribe, and in highly controlled, dis-
ciplinary surroundings. By a reduction in scale, one achieved a com-
mensurate increase in micro-control of the environment. Here the new 
elites could be shaped from the ground up, Pygmalion-fashion. The 
results were also more legible: so many graduated, so many literate in 
English, so many taught certain crafts and mechanical skills, etc.
A bit like the military model they mimicked, school techniques were 
meant to be a shocking and comprehensive baptism. The clothes stu-
dents arrived in were discarded and military kits issued in their place; 
their diet was changed completely to a white diet; their hair (often an 
important cultural badge) was cut; facial paint forbidden; time disci-
pline imposed; conversation in native languages severely punished; 
and, of course, new names mandated. A Sioux memoir of naming in 
the boarding school captures the atmosphere:
The new recruit’s acquisition of a uniform was followed by the acquisi-
tion of a new name. Most often it occurred on the first day of instruc-
tion. In the case of Luther Standing Bear, he remembers that one day 
there was a lot of strange marks on the blackboard, which an interpreter 
explained were whitemen’s names. One by one the students were asked 
to approach the blackboard with a pointer and were instructed to choose 
a name. When a name was selected, the teacher wrote it on a piece of 
white tape, which was then sewn on the back of the boy’s shirt. When 
Standing Bear’s turn came, he took the pointer and acted as if he were 
about to touch an enemy. By the end of the class, all the students had the 
name of a white man sewn on their backs. In the case of Luther Standing 
Bear, he needed only to choose a first name and was able to keep part of 
his Indian name in English translation. Not all the boarding school stu-
dents had this luxury.
Like many utopian schemes of standardization, the project of 
renaming Native Americans was a messy affair. It was common, as in 
the Philippines, for one authority to codify names without noting, in 
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each case, the results of earlier naming exercises. Efforts to create new 
names in the boarding schools indicating paternity were seldom coor-
dinated with renaming on the reservation where their fathers lived, 
thus leading to nearly hopeless confusion. Two brothers named in 
separate exercises might not be given the same last name. But, simi-
lar to the case of the Philippines, over several decades, the frequency 
of contact with officialdom ensured that most Native Americans had 
legal names that conformed to the Anglo-American normative patriar-
chal order. Practice, of course, was something else again.
IV. Standardization and Control for Profit: McDonalds and Forests
Assessing and controlling any activity encourages standardization. 
The more standardized the product and process, the easier it is to mon-
itor from above and outside. It is easier to oversee a plantation with a 
single crop and a workforce in a barracks than to oversee a hundred 
individual farms. It is easier to oversee an assembly line with a rigidly 
defined division of labor than to oversee a hundred artisans producing 
the same product.
This is the logic that lies behind, for instance, the corporate model of 
the McDonalds franchises. Although under constant pressure to adapt 
to local tastes and cuisines, McDonalds has thrived largely by pro-
ducing reliable, uniform products according to a carefully calibrated 
layout of the individual franchise, varying only by the relative size of 
the operation and façade now re-engineered to blend in with the local 
architectural styles. The standard layout and raw materials not only 
facilitate the reliable production of a standardized product but they 
are a crucial tool of management. The inspector from headquarters can 
arrive at a McDonalds restaurant, clipboard and checklist in hand, in 
order to rate the quality of the performance of a standardized ritual at 
this site. Everything should be in its place (fryers, oil, patties, lettuce, 
tomatoes, pickles); the standardized equipment should be clear and 
well maintained; and the division of labor in the management plan 
meticulously observed. It is the standardization of the McDonalds as 
units as well as the uniformity of the product that make this degree of 
management control possible. There is nothing particularly novel here. 
The same might be said for the standardized units of infantry divi-
sions; historically they were designed to all match the same format and 
an officer could be transferred from one battalion to another and find 
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roughly the same table of organization, procedures, ranks, and, above 
all, training expectations.
In other work, I have tried to show how such schemes of standard-
ization are likely to fail in contexts in which the tasks are complex 
and changing, or when they overlook external (boundary conditions) 
ecological limits, which they inadvertently violate. The late 18th cen-
tury invention of scientific forestry is a case in point. Prior to that time, 
the princes of Saxony and Prussia auctioned off tracts of their domain 
forests to bidders who, in turn, estimated the profits they might expect 
from extracting fuel wood and lumber, and bid accordingly. The results 
were uneven. In an effort to ensure themselves steady revenue—and a 
sustainable yield—the princes turned to specialists in “cameral sci-
ence,” as it was known in that day. It was the science of rationalizing the 
revenue and expenditures of the monarchy. To make a very long story 
short, these specialists selected what they judged to be a representative 
section of the forest, in terms of soil classes, tree-species distribution, 
and age of growth, and then surveyed it meticulously, conducting a 
census, as it were, of every single tree. Assistants equipped with trays 
with five bins of nails, each color coded to correspond to one of five 
size-classes of trees they had been trained to recognize, set out every 
morning, twenty abreast. As they came to each and every tree, they 
selected the nail corresponding to its size class (Normalbaume) and 
drove it in. At the end of the day, having begun with a known number 
of nails, they had a complete inventory of that section of the forest by 
size-class of trees. At the end of the whole exercise they had a complete 
inventory of the whole sector of the forest.
It was a comparatively simple matter, then, using solid geometry, to 
calculate the square meters of lumber and firewood that this represen-
tative sample of the forest contained and, assuming a certain market 
price, to calculate the revenue that might be obtained from it. Further, 
by making a few simple assumptions about mean growth rates of 
timber in average years, it was possible to devise a cutting schedule 
that would produce steady, reliable revenue, in principle forever. This 
exercise also has given us the basis of the logging-tables and cutting-
schedules used by trained foresters ever since.
The next step, however, was in the direction of radical simplifica-
tion and, as we shall see, fateful. Having narrowed their view of the 
forest to a simple one-commodity machine, they were inclined to take 
further steps to maximize its revenue yield. As the successful bidders 
felled sections of the forest (what we would today call clear-cutting) 
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that they had won at auction, the revenue advisors had already real-
ized that the two fastest growing trees, depending on whether the soil 
were sandy or not, were the Scotch Pine or the Norway Spruce. Why 
not, they reasoned, replant the forest with one of these fast-growing 
species? And, while they were replanting the forest, why not replant 
it in alleys or straight rows that would make it easier to observe and 
manage and, when the time came, the trees could more easily be felled 
into the alleys and hauled away at less cost? At first, this scheme was a 
runaway success. At that time the normal rotation for a tree crop was 
80 years and the replanted spruce and pines grew rapidly (probably 
because they took swift advantage of the accumulated soil-capital of 
the old growth forest and the felled trees’ root channels.) In any event, 
the success lasted for a century (until roughly twenty years into the 
second rotation) and in this period became, and still is, the worldwide 
standard for scientific forestry.
What is important and most striking here is the determined, utili-
tarian, tunnel vision of the forest as a one-commodity machine. This 
vision is notable, above all, for what it leaves out. From a naturalist’s 
perspective, nearly everything is missing. Gone was the vast majority 
of flora: grasses, flowers, lichens, ferns, shrubs, mushrooms, and vines. 
Gone too were the reptiles, birds, amphibians, and innumerable species 
of insects, not to mention most species of fauna, except those of direct 
interest to the crown’s gamekeepers. The forest was managed not only 
as if it produced a single commodity but also as if it had but a single 
user. The popular uses of the forest for hunting and gathering, pastur-
age, fishing, charcoal making, tanning, trapping, and minerals were 
overlooked or, more commonly, suppressed as interfering with sound 
management. The imminent ideal at work here, never quite achieved in 
practice but ardently pursued, was a forest that would approximate a 
field of row crops managed for maximum production or, if you would 
prefer a military metaphor, a parade ground with the trees aligned in 
straight rows like so many look-alike conscripts. Quite apart from the 
utilitarian aims behind the scheme there was a visual idea, almost a 
secular religion, about how the forest should look. As with McDonalds 
franchises, the greater the uniformity of the forest, the greater the ease 
of inspection and management. Forest science, backed by state power, 
had the capacity to transform the real, diverse, and chaotic old-growth 
forest into a new, more uniform forest that more closely resembled the 
administrative grid of its techniques.
Heedless of the then (and today) poorly understood dynamics of 
forest ecology, the new scientific forestry was catastrophic for forest 
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health. It produced mono-cropped, same-age forests that were radi-
cally more prone to diseases and windfalls than the old-growth forests 
they had replaced. The single species forest, in turn, radically dimin-
ished the bio-diversity of the forest in terms of floral, faunal, avian, and 
insect life. After a hundred years of this great experiment, the failing 
(in pure economic terms) and diseased forests prompted the Germans 
to invent the term Waldsterben (forest death) and to devise a host of 
artificial measures to reintroduce habitats for the now absent insects, 
birds, and small fauna. Just as the Germans had invented forest sci-
ence, they now became pioneers in “forest hygiene” and “restoration 
forestry.”
A. Standardization: National and International
Lest I am misunderstood, I should make it clear that national projects 
of standardization are part and parcel of nation building and modern 
state formation. They are a technique, a capacity available to the state, 
and can be used for good or ill—in most cases a morally troubling 
combination of the two. Perhaps the greatest and most emancipatory 
simplification of the democratic state was the creation of the univer-
sal citizen in the French Revolution, an abstract person bearing rights 
before the law equal to that of any other citizen. As a radical simplifica-
tion replacing the finely graded rights of the various medieval estates 
before the law, it was a step toward formal equality that still justifiably 
mesmerizes much of the world. At the same time, it is important to 
recognize that it also set the stage for universal conscription little more 
than a decade afterwards, under Napoleon.
B. Bi-Polar Projects of Standardization: 1945–1989
There were, for nearly a half century after World War II, essentially 
two competing projects for governance at large in the world: the social-
ist bloc and the liberal capitalist democracies.
Each of these projects was something of a political module that its 
purveyors thought could be transferred as a package. Using their geo-
political power, their trade and aid, and their military alliances, each 
bloc endeavored (and to some real degree, succeeded) in reshaping 
their allies in the Cold War.
One could travel virtually anywhere in the Socialist Bloc, for exam-
ple, Angola, Mozambique, Vietnam, Cuba, Bulgaria, or China, and 
find comparable practices adapted from the template (we might even 
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say Vatican) of the Socialist Bloc, the Soviet Union. Collectivized agri-
culture, a state-directed economy with ubiquitous five-year plans, 
the organization of civilian ministries and the armed forces, the same 
sacred texts, the same Central Committee of the Communist Party, and 
the same emphasis on rapid industrialization were strikingly familiar 
throughout the socialist world. Even tiny Laos, a subsistence economy 
if there ever was one, had to have its Five-Year Plans and even its May 
Day parade, a very “low church” copy of the May Day parade in the 
Kremlin.
C. Uni-Polarity and the Washington Consensus: Post-1989
After the Berlin Wall was breached, the socialist project of standardiza-
tion no longer had a hegemon behind it and was quick to dissipate. 
None of us have any strong reason to be nostalgic about the Cold 
War and the disappearance of Soviet-style economies and polities. It is 
worth noting, however, that the existence of a competing paradigm had 
real-world consequences for each of the competitors. It is fairly clear 
that during the Civil Rights Movement, the Kennedys were exquisitely 
sensitive to the political capital that the Soviet Union could exploit by 
portraying the United States as a racist social order. It is more than 
likely that this consideration helped trump the backlash expected from 
Southern Democrats to incline the Kennedys to a more active interven-
tion on behalf of civil rights in the south than they would otherwise 
have considered. The same could be said for U.S. policies in the Third 
World. In places like the Philippines and Vietnam, beset by communist 
insurrections and characterized by massive inequalities in landown-
ership, the United States actively backed some modest measures of 
land reform. The idea that the champion of liberal economies and the 
Lockean defense of property rights should actually pursue the redis-
tribution of the most important asset in these agrarian economies was 
surely the result of the attractiveness of the land reforms undertaken 
in China and the North Vietnam to landless peasants and tenants. It is 
also diagnostic that programs of “land reform” disappeared altogether 
from the agenda of USAID and the international agencies under strong 
United States influence after the collapse of the Socialist Bloc in 1989.
The neo-liberal new order, I believe, can be usefully seen as a vast 
anti-vernacular machine. Its immanent logic, never fully realized, is to 
replicate the institutional order and practices of the developed, liberal 
democracies of the North Atlantic (overlooking, for the moment, Japan, 
Australia, and New Zealand). The institutional lords of this project are 
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the great multinational institutions controlled by these liberal democ-
racies: the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World 
Trade Organization (WTO), European Union (EU), and the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
The consistent effort to replace illegible, vernacular practices with 
the standards of these agencies is typically described euphemistically 
by the term harmonization, a brilliant slogan if there ever was one. It 
creates the image of a vast chorus being trained to sing a collective mel-
ody in unison and in tune. Who could object to “harmony” as opposed 
to, say, discord and dissonance? Although the process sounds innocu-
ous enough, it is largely advanced by what some of my colleagues in 
political science have called “troffers” (a combination of a threat and 
an offer). Structural adjustment loans are of this nature. They offer a 
valuable loan on condition that the borrowing country brings its fiscal 
and governance practices into tune with the demands of the lender. 
My objective for the remainder of this essay is to call attention to the 
“sheet music” and “tune” that is being played here.
We might understand this process best by focusing on perhaps the 
greatest contemporary project of institutional standardization in the 
world today: the creation of individual freehold tenure throughout the 
Global South. There is hardly a country in the Global South that is not 
in the process of systematically surveying land and issuing titles to cre-
ate a national cadastral, property map. The World Bank titling project 
is a neo-liberal property creating module. (Send US $49.95 and receive 
the World Bank land titling “kit” with easy to follow instructions!) The 
goal of this effort to eliminate exotic forms of vernacular land tenure in 
all pre-liberal societies is two-fold. First, and most important, it aims 
to create secure and transferable title to land so as to create a national 
market for land. By neo-liberal logic, this will make it possible for land, 
like labor and capital, the other factors of production, to seek the high-
est return in the market and thereby spur economic growth. It will also 
make possible a national land tax register in which the state can ratio-
nally tax land to raise revenue and to promote its profitable use.
In many respects, land titling is the centerpiece for the creation of 
liberal economies in the Global South. Yet it is hardly the only proj-
ect of the root-and-branch restructuring of institutions and economies 
throughout poor countries. Harmonization is also being fostered in a 
host of related fields: the creation of intellectual property rights on the 
North Atlantic model, easing restrictions on the movement of capital 
and the repatriation of profits, privatization of many public services, 
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standardized patent law, the creation of fully convertible currencies, 
standardized procedures for the incorporation of private enterprises, 
independent central banks operating according to accepted interna-
tional standards, the collection of statistics and indices to accord with 
United Nations and OECD formats, standardized government fiscal 
and monetary accounts…the list is nearly endless.
The main point here is comparatively simple. All of these projects of 
standardization and harmonization are represented as cosmopolitan 
universals. They are, of course, anything but universals. Any practice, 
any institution that becomes internationally hegemonic, began, once, 
as vernacular practice at a particular time and in a particular place. 
Most of the practices we are describing are the vernacular practices 
and institutions of North Atlantic capitalist democracies, now “cross-
dressed” as cosmopolitan universals. Riding the back of British and 
French imperialism and, subsequently, United States military and eco-
nomic hegemony and the post-war Western institutional order, these 
quaint, vernacular practices have become hegemonic largely because 
their originators and carriers have become hegemonic. One might even 
say that the crucial stage of ideological and civilizational hegemony 
comes at that point when the institutions of the hegemon are no longer 
experienced as local and vernacular but are seen as universals. In just 
this way did Sung and Ming China and, for that matter, the Roman 
Empire come to see their governance practices and institutions as cos-
mopolitan universals to be copied by everyone.
The immanent logic of this vast standardization is different in scale 
but not in kind from the uniformity of the scientific forest or of McDon-
alds. To the degree that it is successful, it generalizes the institutional 
setting of the North Atlantic world. Let’s imagine, for example, a North 
Atlantic businesswoman getting off a standardized jet at a standard-
ized airport in Conakry, Maputo, Vientiane, Asuncion, Seoul, Rangoon, 
Ulan Bator, or Tirana. If the harmonization project has been largely 
successful, she would encounter a legal order, business laws, currency 
regulations, and a property regime that would be thoroughly familiar. 
And why not? They are precisely the institutions she left behind at 
home. They are her own institutions now transplanted to this new set-
ting as the international standard. These institutions may be exotic and 
frustrating hieroglyphics to local people used to their previous ver-
nacular institutions and practices, but to the cosmopolitan Westerner, 
they are familiar waters in which to navigate…and prevail.
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Not everything, of course, will be the same. The “natives” will 
retain their languages, their cuisine, their music, their dances and their 
beaches and mountains and their geography—the more so if these 
differences are successful commodities that can be capitalized on the 
tourist market.
I want to qualify the assumption that the natives will keep their 
own languages. They will, but, to the extent that they harmonize their 
economy, their governance structures, and even their tourist economy, 
with international standards, they will have to produce a substantial 
population that also speaks the language of international harmoniza-
tion: English.
V. English as a Vernacular Cross-Dressed as a 
Cosmopolitan Universal
The “career” of English as a soi-disant “world language” closely tracks 
the standardization of North Atlantic economic and institutional forms. 
English is a once quaint, minor, vernacular dialect of the Germanic 
family of languages (as are Dutch, Danish, Swedish, and Norwegian). 
Inflected by the French of the Norman conquerors and the Latin of 
the church fathers, English, like individual freehold property, came to 
hegemony on the historical contingency of British naval dominance 
and American hegemony. Socio-linguists are fond of a joke that cap-
tures the process here. “What,” they ask, “is the difference between a 
dialect and a national language?” The answer: “A national language is 
a dialect with an army.” In the same way, it is the imperial might of the 
bearers of English that have made it into a world language and not just 
a minor dialect. As the hegemonic language of trade and imperialism, 
it was, and is, in the interest of millions across the globe to learn the 
recondite mysteries of English. (How many thousands of Chinese are, 
at this moment, studying for the Test of English as a Foreign Language-
TOEFL? A photograph in the New York Times last year showed the 
T-shirt of a receding bicyclist in Beijing which bore the slogan, “F*** 
TOEFL.”)
However it may represent itself as a universal and however rein-
vented by speakers across the globe, English bears all the historical 
traces of its narrow, provincial, historical origins. One can scarcely find 
a figure of speech in the language that does not make direct or oblique 
reference to the peculiarities of its birth, e.g., “The grass is always 
greener on the other side of the fence,” “Eating high off the hog,” or 
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“Make hay while the sun shines.” At every turn, the language encodes 
the history and practices of those who first spoke it as a native tongue 
just as the practice of freehold tenure encodes the cultural practices of 
the Anglo-American world in the 18th and early 19th centuries. Those 
of us who have had the unique good fortune to have English as our 
mother tongue are paid, as it were, a huge imperial dividend every 
day of our lives, simply because of the lucky coincidence that our 
native tongue has become the language of imperium.
VI. Counter-Hegemonic Projects?
The rather bleak picture depicted here of the triumph of North Atlantic 
would-be universals over innumerable vernaculars disappearing every 
day might be seen as far too pessimistic. There are, after all, a host of 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who do battle daily with the 
likes of the IMF, the WTO, and the World Bank at the G-8 Summits, 
Davos, and on the ground throughout poor countries. In fact, NGOs 
that are in one way or another opposed to these multinational agen-
cies are something of a growth industry for the otherwise unemployed 
intelligentsia of the developed world. I would wager that such activi-
ties are a major employer of Scandinavian, Dutch, and German univer-
sity graduates working abroad. Although agencies like the World Bank 
have increasingly tried to co-opt such NGOs as subcontractors for 
many of their interventions, there is little doubt that many NGOs have 
played a vital role, particularly in the environmental field, in thwarting 
the ill-considered schemes cooked up between national governments 
and multi-lateral lending agencies.
Most, but not all, of these NGOs are Western inspired, Western 
financed, and, in many cases, Western staffed. More importantly, such 
institutions are also typically themselves the bearers of North Atlantic 
institutional forms, notably human rights, women’s emancipation, vot-
ing rights and fair electoral rules, press freedom, habeas corpus, and 
transparency of financial transactions and official conduct. However 
emancipatory they may seem, there is no gainsaying that they, like 
freehold property, derive from popular vernacular struggles in the 
North Atlantic world over the past three centuries. Although many of 
these projects are opposed to the neo-liberal order of the Washington 
Consensus, they transpose lock-stock-and-barrel what was originally 
a Western vernacular debate to the Global South. It is something of a 
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left-handed tribute to Western hegemony that much of the opposition 
to it in the Global South is itself a Western import.
There is, I believe, a plausible objection to be lodged here. Many of 
the emancipatory struggles that originated in the West have gone on 
to have a vigorous vernacular history in the Global South. India now 
has well over a century of far more competitive party politics than that 
experienced by Americans, and it is clear that the average Indian peas-
ant behind his plough is far more sophisticated about party politics 
than the typical American. Elections and party politics are therefore 
surely as—if not more—indigenous to India as they are to Great Brit-
ain or France. The problem with a sharp division between “imported 
exotics” and “local vernaculars” is that over time the former often 
become thoroughly naturalized. In such cases, the principles behind a 
Western-inspired NGO may have a great deal of local traction. Even so, 
the understanding of the principles involved may be far from identical. 
I am told that women’s NGOs in India, many of which are financed 
by Scandinavian women’s aid organizations, spend far more of their 
time and energy on spousal abuse, marriage rights, and divorce laws—
issues of great concern in Europe—than do locally-rooted women’s 
organizations which devote their energies to issues of promoting eco-
nomic livelihood, arguably more germane to women’s empowerment 
in the Indian context.3
Let me end with a question. This is not a rhetorical question; I do 
not know the answer, if indeed there is one. I believe, however, that it 
is a question that is “good to think with.” The question occurred to me 
as I realized that in most of the contexts in which the word “civiliza-
tion” was used in the 19th century, the word “development” has been 
used throughout much of the 20th century. Is there a parallel between 
the relationship of the emancipatory NGO projects of which we have 
been speaking to the neo-liberal economic order, on the one hand, and 
the relationship between 19th-century Christian missionaries to the 
colonial authorities, on the other? Are they both Western civilizational 
projects in part at odds with one another? To put it another way, is the 
relationship between NGOs and the neo-liberal order of the World 
Bank the same as the relationship between Bartolomé de las Casas and 
the conquistadors?
However one chooses to answer this question one fact is not in 
doubt. There is an amazing institutional convergence afoot in the world 
and, correspondingly, a great loss in cultural and institutional diver-
sity—eliminating both the ugly and the beautiful vernaculars. •
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Notes
1. Local practice in a contemporary Malay-Muslim village, where there are no perma-
nent patronyms and where the number of given names is similarly limited, follows 
much the same pattern. Kasim, who owns a small store, is distinguished from four 
other Kasims in the village by being called “Kasim-kedai” (Store Kasim); Ahmad, who 
can read the Qur’an, is called “Lebai-[Ah]mat;” Mansor, who was tripped up when 
his sarong fell down while chasing children, is called (only behind his back, of course) 
“Mansur-terlondeh” (Mansor of the Accidentally Falling Sarong); and Zakariah, who has 
a harelip is called (also behind his back) “[Zakar]iah-rabit” (Hare-lip Zakariah). In this 
Malay-Muslim village, each of these names is locally, but only locally, definitive. Only 
a relative insider is likely to know who has the village reputation for laziness, who can 
recite the Qur’an, who tripped on his sarong, or which John is William’s son. The ver-
nacular system is perfectly discriminating for those with the requisite local knowledge to 
understand each reference. Without a local tracker to fill in the missing information for 
identification, the outsider would be at a loss.
2. Our hypothetical example is, in effect, a best case scenario, with only eight given names. 
Assume, for a moment, that the names are not evenly distributed; assume that the name, 
say, “William,” is so popular that half the men in the village bear it, and the other seven 
names are evenly distributed among the remainder. In that case, the police agent, look-
ing for a particular William, will face 285 aliases if the villagers have only a single name, 
81 aliases in a village with two names, and 39 aliases in a village with three names. The 
point is that anything less than an even distribution of names appreciably raises the odds 
that the “suspect” with a more common name will elude identification.
3. In passing, it ought to be observed that a great deal of domestic NGO activity in India 
and in the United States is devoted precisely to opposing various North Atlantic uni-
versalisms in the name of vernacular practices. The Hindu right wing in India and the 
Christian and Jewish fundamentalists in the United States have adroitly used the orga-
nizational and mobilization techniques of the Left to defend vernacular practices against 
secular and civic universalism.
